[bisq-network/proposals] Certification for ownership of a bank account (#23)

Manfred Karrer notifications at github.com
Mon Jun 4 18:34:47 UTC 2018


@alexej996 Yes you are right with the possibility for the bank to find the hash by checking their user base (though I consider that pretty unlikely). A simple solution for that is what we use in the account age witness: To add a salt to the bank ID data for creating the hash - the bank does not know the salt. The salt will be passed to the trade peer who will be the only one who can verify the hash.

The fractional amount will still be a pattern which might be easy for banks to detect potential Bisq users but first, it is not illegal to use Bisq (and if it is in a county people should not use it anyway as too risky to get caught by an undercover agent) and second, if banks would block user by such a pattern they risk a high rate of false positives. The same is true for the reference text which has also the same weakness of a fingerprint but as well would comes with high risk for false positives for the banks to use that to block users.  

Ultimately: 
I think the weakest poin regarding privacy is on the blockchain side. The trade txs are a clear pattern to detect and user who don't take care when they spend or fund their wallet are easily caught by chain analysis companies. Bitcoins privacy is unfortunately pretty fragile at least for the majority of users who do not take a lot of care and understand the systems very well. 
The only solution mid term I see her is CoinJoin which is loosely planned for some time and off chain transactions which might become possible after the BSQ is implemented. 
Using Monero is another option. I have a call with a dev then next days to check out options....   

So to update the last proposal:
The user creates a hash from the bank ID (e.g. IBAN) + a random salt (salt is persisted by user).
The app derives from that hash the required withdrawal amount. 
He sends the bank name (as in the browser url) and the hash to the arbitrator. They arrange a screen sharing session where the user is instructed to hide identifying data like bank id or name and only reveal the transaction of the withdrawal and the browser address.
The arbitrator signs the hash and publishes hash + signature + index of his pub key (hard coded in app).
At trade the peer will verify that the hash (bank ID + salt) and signature is correct.

The only way how a scammer could trick the system is if he has his own bank account at the same bank. He could then make a own withdrawal and show that to the arbitrator. He use the hash + salt from the stolen account for the hash which the arbitrator signs. In a trade the peer will correctly verify the hash and the scam is undetected. 
But the likelihood that the scammer has the same bank is rather low and it would require that the scammer understands the system very well. 
We could even mitigate that by requiring to reveal the first 3 characters of the bank ID in the verification. So I think that is not a critical problem. I would actually add that requirement to the proposal above.

I fully understand your concerns but in fact I think that the current arbitration model has much bigger problems in that regards (planned in the fully decentralized version to get resolved).
It is true that there not all cases ending up in dispute but also that feature is optional and not all need to use it. Furthermore it is mainly relevant to be used by BTC buyers.

I followed a bit some forum/reddit threads the last weeks and had the impression many LocalBitcoins traders are considering to move over to Bisq but many don't trust the security model (many did not understand it as well) and the chargeback topic came up repeatably.
Lets assume we get a healthy wave of new user and our volume multiplies and with that scammers get attracted to check out how they can abuse Bisq. With the current situation a stolen bank account scammer with 300 USD on the account can easily use Bisq to cash out and the victim likely suffer a chargeback. As one on the forum said those scammers are often not "full time professional" scammers but people in poor counties who use any opportunity to make money they can find. 300 USD is a lot in many countries and there can be many such people and stolen account for sale on the dark markets (would be interesting actually to check that out). 
So I would not underestimate that risk, but of course we will only know once it happens. 

I just want to be at least prepared to react quickly if we would get into such a situation and not risk to lose all the gained volume because of a wave of scams which would damage Bisq's reputation. It takes very long to build up good reputation but can get lost very fast and it would take long time to recover.

But I am very happy to see those critical inputs and don't want to push that too hard if I don't see strong support. I just think the privacy issues are solvable and the additional task for the arbitrator is a price the security improvement is worth it.  

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