[bisq-network/proposals] Proposal for new trade protocol without the need for arbitrators (#52)

[Manfred Karrer]

@cbeams just reminded me on one important function of the arbitrator which might get lost in the new system: That the arbitrators **enforce the trade protocol rules** and by adjusting the payout they can fine-tune the "punishement" for violations.

There are certain cases of light violations and we have to take care that user learn from their mistakes and don't repeat those. 
Examples are:
- Paying too late
- Not using the trade ID in 'reason for payment' field
- Using 'Bisq' or 'Bitcoin/BTC' in 'reason for payment’ field (more serious)
- Paying from a different account (triangular scam risk - also more serious issue)

One way we could support that function in the new model would be to have a list of suggested "fines" for such violations. Most are pretty clear and if that list says "Paying from a different account" costs 50% of the security deposit (or a fix btc value) there should not be much discussion left to the traders to apply that rule to their payout. 
So the traders have themself the option to change the payout. Both need to agree on that and only then both sign that payout tx. By that we would delegate that punishment to the traders themself. If the wrongdoer would not agree it can lead in the worst case to the timelocked payout to the donation receiver and the trader who acted correctly can request for reimbursement. The wrongdoer will have little chance to get reimbursed if the case was clear. 

Of course there will be a grey area and if traders are very non cooperative such cases might become messy. But both risk that the mediator and stakeholders make a jedgement against them.  For instance in case one trader has paid one day too late and can proof that his bank had issues or it was a long bank weekend holiday and the other trader show zero tolerance to that and require the full "punishment" and it lead to a real dispute, the one who show zero tolerance is also risking that the mediator and stakeholder are in favor of the one who paid too late. 
It will be hard to predict and find rules for all such possible cases and we need to trust a bit on common sense and good intentions. Worst case we will have such cases from time to time and might lose traders because of a bad experience. That can also happen now if the arbitrator enforces a rule and one of the peer is not accepting it mentally and leaves Bisq because he felt unfairly treated (I am not aware of such a case but is possible it has happened).
 
Beside the financial punishment there might be other possibilities to ensure the trade protocol rules are followed. We could emphasize some sort of reputation system. Again the #27 might be one option here to add some negative score. Traders who are repeating violations will have it harder to find trading peers. 

In general moving from a authority who do the punishment to the peer who is doing it or even better they find consensus of a fair adjustment can be considered a positive change. But of course things can become more blurry and the "human factor" creeps in more here. But Bisq is not built to eleminate the human factor but rather to tame it for increasing social cooperation.

It is important to note here that the core protocol is not related to those "detail problems", this flexibility to find solutions around the core protocol which make the whole process more smooth is a big advantage. Even if we don't get it right from the start we can adjust it over time without the need to change the protocol.

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