[bisq-network/proposals] Proposal for new trade protocol without the need for arbitrators (#52)

[Harry MacFinned]

@ManfredKarrer wrote:
> Another idea we had earlier was to use BSQ bonding. Scammers do not want to invest and risk money (thats probably why we have nearly no scammers as with the security deposit in a Bisq trade they need to invest/risk something). So if we require a long term BSQ bond from anyone who wants to get reimbursed we keep most scammers out. But that requirement became also obsolete with the new model with the timelocked payout. But maybe we could still use it for such edge cases that the stakeholders require something extra to filter out the scammers. E.g. if both request they have to put up a BSQ bond which is locked up for a long time to provide some sort of "reputation".

This is imo really a good way to go.
Users should be allowed to define themselves, on a free will, the bond they are ok to attach to their account. And to increase/decrease this bond at their will. And they could of course exhibit their bond as a proof of goodwilling and professionalism (for some).
I may be wrong, but I bet that on the maker side Bisq has already a majority of pro or quite pro traders. Giving them means to display their professional and good willing could be a interesting tool for those people who contribute daily to Bisq's success.



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