[bisq-network/proposals] Removal of money orders (#75)

Manfred Karrer notifications at github.com
Sun Mar 17 17:15:18 UTC 2019

I think F2F and MO has different circumstances. 

Scamming someone in a F2F trade carries lots of risk for the scammer as well. 
Scamming someone with MO seems riskless for the scammer.

If we know that there is a method how to scam the peer without taking risk I think it is not a good idea to just delegate it to the user and assume they fully understand the risk. 

In reality users often start a trade and don't understand really how even Bisq works. To fully understand the risk situation with a payment methods requires much more experience. I certainly did not had a clue  about such risks before I started working on Bisq and when I did my first LBTC trade I also did not fully understand the risks and the system. 
A user who got scammed will likely be a frustrated Bisq user, never coming back and not recommending Bisq in the best case and in the worst case he will make negative prototion that there is lots of scam going on at Bisq (as it is the case with LBTC). LBTC also has warnings and educational material about risks, etc. but the fact that there is a high scam rate falls back to them and many people have the impression LBTC sucks as there are too many scammers, even those might mostly happen with payment methods which are marked as high risk like Paypal. Also having one payment methods where scam is systematically possible will attract scammer and then they will explore other options as well. Prefer to not give them any honey to attract them in the first place.

I am also not so sure how much privay protection MO really delivers as I heard that it requires ID verification. But I don't know details...
We would still need a payment method expert who really understands all the context and can give solid advice.

We might have new options once the DAO is out, like using a bond for reputation. That would work pretty good with MO as there is no chargeback risk but only a risk in the short timer period of the trade. So only for that period the bond need to be able to cover the trade amount. Still would require more as a scammer could make several trades in parallel and the total trade sum might not be covered by the bond anymore. 

Another option is burned BSQ (proof of burn) to create reputation one will not want to lose by getting marked as a scammer.... 

Too early to think on concrete implementations of those options but I think those will enable higher risk payment methods without losing security.

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