[bisq-network/proposals] Send arbitration funds to a burning address instead of BTC donation address. (#135)

MwithM notifications at github.com
Wed Nov 6 10:25:52 UTC 2019


> If I understand it correctly, you suggest to renounce to reduce the supply of BSQ by buying BSQ with those BTC and burning them. Is that correct? I guess that if the disputes are rare, it wouldn´t be a big problem for BSQ supply.

Yes, I'm proposing to renounce to BSQ supply reduction. Disputes are rare in a normal situation, because traders are not willing to momentarily lose their deposits, delay trades and paying arbitation fees.
But in this proposal I'm talking about a possible attack from the DAO BTC address holder, or a colluding party. Attacker creates its own trades and is willing to go to arbitration letting the timelock to activate. When timelock is activated, it will send funds to DAO BTC address holder, which is the same as the attacker. In one week, or even in a couple days of this attack, the reward would be higher than the 5BTC deposit that the DAO BTC address holder has locked.
What I'm proposing is a way to stop this attack from happening, which would hurt a lot the credibility of the whole project. Sending BTC to an address managed by a bonded role only works if that address is less than the amount of the bond. If the address owner is dishonest, and incentives for bad behaviour are very high, there will be an attack.

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