[bisq-network/bisq] Add rpc wallet protection endpoints (#4214)
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Tue May 19 01:20:52 UTC 2020
The full thread is tedious, so thanks for the comment. Please do read this comment and help me clarify something I think needs to be changed?
To be direct, my question is:
Should `CoreWalletService` inject `TradeWalletService` so `CoreWalletService` can use the cached `TradeWalletService#aesKey`, instead of it's own (duplicate) copy of the `aesKey`?
Parts of this PR relevant to your comments are (1) an `unlockwallet` method that takes a password and caches the derived aesKey, and (2) a `lockwallet` method that clears the cached aesKey.
Before I figured out all I needed for most encrypted wallet operations was the aesKey, I made sure kludged unlock/lock wallet methods worked for me by removing and re-setting the password (both causing a wallet re-write). Seeing this in the thread surely caused worry for some, not to mention
> (not sure if already resolved, have not read the full thread...)
Then I changed the `unlockwallet` and `lockwallet` methods so they do not trigger wallet re-writes -- after looking more closely at bitcoin-cli and the bisq UI events that trigger `onAesKey()`.
In the final merge, `CoreWalletService#unlockWallet()` caches the password arg derived aesKey, and `CoreWalletService#lockWallet()` clears that cached aesKey. Right now, there are no gRPC endpoints that need that cached aesKey, but my assumption is operations such as funds withdrawal and tx-signing will need the key, and not the password used to derive it.
Keeping that key in memory between "unlock" and "lock" commands is a security risk, but maybe less of one than typing the password in the console for every operation on an encrypted wallet?
If you think my assumptions behind the `unlockwallet` and `lockwallet` impls are incorrect, let me know... If not, I repeat the question: should `CoreWalletService` inject `TradeWalletService` so `CoreWalletService` can use the cached `TradeWalletService#aesKey`, instead of it's own (duplicate) copy of the `aesKey`?
I did implement it then backed it out, waiting for an endpoint that actually needs the aesKey to work (or your recommendation, whichever came first).
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