[bisq-network/proposals] Scheme for locked funds with non responsive peers (#275)

[chimp1984]

I fear that does not work because there will be a race of both traders and none has a guarantee that the other is not publishing. So if Alice was honest and want to avoid a refund agent case then she would wait until block X+Y to publish the tx where she receives all funds. Assume Bob is dishonest and try to get also the funds without having fulfilled the trade contract. He can also wait for block X+Y and publish the tx to him. Then there are 2 competing transactions and a 50% chance or each to win. Bob has better odds as he has less to lose (only the sec. deposit). So it is rational for Alice to not enter that game where she has worse odds and open a refund agent case instead and not risk to lose all the funds.

Also: The motivation to reduce refund agent cases are more on Bisq's/DAO side. For a user it is quite comfortable (in case the amount is not high and refund agent pays directly from his pocked without DAO reimbursement). Users are delegating the burden to the DAO (it was designed so to avoid too much friction for users).  

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