[bisq-network/bisq] Revert "Deactive confirm buttons once mediation started" (#4562)

[cd2357]

> for about 80% of my mediation cases I never had to make a suggested payout, and could close with TRADE_ALREADY_SETTLED, because the mediation was either successful or unnecessary, and the traders were able to complete the trades themselves.

Is that because these trades just went over the trade time limit, and the seller took longer to confirm the received payment?

If yes, then how about enforcing this trade period? As they say, rules that have no consequences are not rules.

This is how it can be enforced:
- as soon as trade begins, a countdown timer starts for the buyer: please make the payment within this time (A), else every 1d of delay will cost you 20% of your deposit in case of mediation
- once the payment is made, a countdown timer starts for the seller: please confirm the payment within this time (B), else every 1d of delay will cost you 20% of your deposit in case of mediation
- if trade enters mediation, but turns out the buyer lied (clicked "I sent payment" on time, but actually sent the payment much later), then buyer loses security deposit

It could be set up in such a way that the total trade period T is big enough to cover A + B + some buffer.

`T = A + B + buffer`

For example, in case of a SEPA trade of duration 6 days:
- A = 1 days (once the trade starts, buyer should send SEPA payment within 1 day)
- B = 3 days (once payment is marked as started, seller has 3 days to confirm = weekend, where banks are closed + 1 day)

Both parties are incentivized to stay within their timeframe. Both parties could technically be a bit late, but as long as the trade completes within its duration limit, then there is no mediation, so there is no penalty for that.

This means most SEPA trades would finish within at most 4-5 days. The trade limit of 6 days offers 1-2d of extra buffer for eventual delays. But key point here is, once the 6 days are passed, there is obviously a problem and a mediator has to be involved. In this case, it means one of the parties was (very) late, so mediation will involve a penalty for that party, but will be free of charge for the party who was on time.

Honest traders are not penalized, lazy or unattentive ones (who ignore their countdown timer) are, potential profiteurs who want to postpone payment as much as possible, are also penalized.

This should incentivize traders to make the payment + confirm it as soon as they can. As a consequence, that would avoid trades going over the trade period limit, which is the territory of potential profiteurs anyway (waiting for 19 days to make payment, etc).

Would this sort of incentive structure make sense?

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