[bisq-network/proposals] Off-chain trading using a lightning network of BTC & tainted BSQ (#312)

[Steven Barclay]

@chimp1984 Yes, that interpretation is basically correct. Thinking a bit further about the new BSQ tx rules, it would be useful to be able to create more than one TBSQ-ATBSQ pair per tx, just as in your example above (unlike in the original rules I devised, which always create one pair out of the first two outputs only). That would be useful for on-chain txs which atomically exchange newly created TBSQ and BTC between the traders, as in your examples. Also, it would mean that if a lightning channel had built up multiple pairs of differently tainted TBSQ-ATBSQ pairs in its final state (through lots of different trades being routed through it without all being completely cleaned up), then a cooperative channel closure would consist of just a single tx which spends the 2-2 BSQ lockup and creates all the pairs at once. That would be much neater and more efficient than trying to do it in multiple txs. To create multiple pairs of possibly different taint, perhaps one `OP_RETURN` output could be included per pair, or perhaps all the separate TAG & DBH fields could be strung together in a single `OP_RETURN` field (if that wouldn't make it too long).

Also thinking further, the BTC security deposits are unnecessary as you point out, when Alice & Bob both double up as escrow agents and they each contribute some minimum amount to the bond total. (They don't actually have to have equal sized bonds - the total size is what's really important.) This can be seen since they would just be redistributing the escrow among themselves in proportion to their respective bond sizes, in their joint role as escrow agents. (So if their bonds were equal size, for example, they would first split the BTC escrow equally, make the fiat payment and then settle the BTC  - a sort of "pay half now and half on delivery" scheme.) Provided each contribute a bond above some minimum percentage of the total (15 / 1.30 ~= 11.5% for a 15% security deposit), then the initial escrow redistribution to match the bond ratio wouldn't cause the BTC amount of either party to drop below the security deposit, so the security deposit could just be elided. When adjusting the trade parameters, as Alice or Bob's bond starts to drop below 11.5% of the total, it would be necessary for them both to contribute an ever growing BTC security deposit starting from 0%, until finally it reached 15% when one of the party's bond completely disappeared.

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