[bisq-network/proposals] Implementation of protection tools: strengthening Account Age by requiring payments from 2 Bank Accounts (#93)
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Fri May 24 15:06:43 UTC 2019
Regarding optionality and the pre-trade stage this is another possibility:
- Bisq could enforce the highest possible security deposit for the buyer on buy offers posted by zero age payment accounts.
- When trading with zero age accounts, Sellers triggering Account would be exempt from trading fees (
Then, the Seller Triggering Account could require zero age account buyers one of the following:
1. Nothing, the account age of the buyer would be triggered by confirming a normal payment. But for this we should enforce some delay for the BTC release (see below)
2. To choose a 2FA verification method before the trade. Buyer would have to choose an option from a closed list. In order to select the 2 bank payment option buyer must have the appropiate account configuration. The chosen verification method of the buyer would be part of the trading contract. If the buyer pays but refuses to verify, the seller should return the money and open a dispute.
3. Not accepting to trade at all with 0 age account buyers.
Option 3 is important for very active traders or market makers, we need those type of users to be very careful with whom they trade. It is also important for users that care a lot about privacy. This option could be eliminated if somehow a pre-trade verification process if finally implemented.
For Option 1 it would be best to enable a delay for releasing the BTC such as the following proposed by @ManfredKarrer in #77:
>Maybe there is still a way to add the payout delay without big effort:
To use the timelock function on the tx level again (as it was in earlier trade protocol) but to make it more simple so that it does not require an extra handshake cycle. It still would be a kind of hard fork but maybe we find some way to mitigate that to cause less harm.
Idea is to just add the timelock in case the buyer is considered risky. Based on the risk level the timelck can be defined from 0 blocks to 4300 blocks (about 1 month). It can be determined at take offer time and without haveing thought in depth about it I do not see a big problem in implementing that. Usability would be the same, just require an info that the btc are released but not usable until the timelock is over. Hope it would not turn out as well in too much UX confusion when looking deeper....
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